Game theoretic approach to offering participation incentives for electric vehicle-To-Vehicle charge sharing

TitleGame theoretic approach to offering participation incentives for electric vehicle-To-Vehicle charge sharing
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2014
AuthorsDutta, Promiti, and Boulanger Albert
Conference Name2014 IEEE Transportation Electrification Conference and Expo: Components, Systems, and Power Electronics - From Technology to Business and Public Policy, ITEC 2014
Date Published2014///
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN Number9781479922628
KeywordsCooperation, Electric vehicles, Game theory, Inductive power transfer, Nash Bargaining
Abstract

Electric vehicles are not penetrating the market as quickly as expected. This is due to limited driving range, time required to recharge a battery, and lack of charging infrastructure in most metropolitan cities. We propose a charge sharing network in which we use inductive power transfer to wirelessly exchange charge between vehicles. In our network, vehicles that have excess charge to share, can sell charge to vehicles needing charge to reach their destination. In this paper, we describe a game theoretic approach to offering incentives for electric vehicles to participate in the charge sharing network. We utilize Nash Bargaining theory to show that participation in the network can yield profits for the seller driving to their destination and that we can increase the number of cars reaching their destination without needing to stop for recharging.

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